Abstract. This paper presents Privilege Calculus (PC) as a new approach of knowledge representation for Separation of Duty (SD) in the view of process and intents to improve the reconfigurability and traceability of SD. PC presumes that the structure of SD should be reduced to the structure of privilege and then the regulation of system should be analyzed with the help of forms of privilege.
Introduction
The Separation of Duty (SD) is a security principle that is used to formulate multi-person control policies, which requires that two or more different people be responsible for completion of a task or a set of related tasks [1] . The RoleBased Access Control (RBAC) system is defined by a state machine model and characterized by the fact that a user's rights to access objects are defined by the user's membership to a "role" and by the roles' permissions to perform operations on those objects [2] . Hence, the role is a semantic referent of duty representation and the structure of role is a division of rights in cross-organization systems. With the help of assignment operation, the user-role assignment can be handled by one while permission-role assignment is handled by another [3] .
Because the permission assignment on role hierarchy is static, Sandhu [4] introduced the Role Activation Hierarchy (RAH). RAH extends the permissionusage hierarchy and makes the role activation governed by an activation hierarchy. Sandhu argued that the administration of RBAC must itself be decentralized and managed by administrative roles. Moreover, Ferraiolo [5] argued that static separation of duty enforces constraints on the assignment of users to roles, and dynamic separation duty places constraints on roles that can be activated within or across a user's session.
Although the delegation model [6] is helpful to resolve the temporal permission assignment problem by the delivery of duty in trust, the permission delegated has to crosscut two or more roles in RAH and the definition working to map between them is not easy. Also, for the constraints in RBAC, there is an inconsistency between the access control policy and the constraints that are specified to limit this policy. One transform limit may preclude, by a constraint, the change in another transform limit even though the rights that embody the conflict have not been assigned yet [7] . So extra mechanisms were integrated to detect [8] and resolve [9] the conflict. Jaeger has argued that since fail-safety is often a goal of secure systems, some form of conflict resolution may not be unreasonable, but the trade-off is not clear-cut [7] .
It is the question that how to keep change of condition predictable and how control exists after reconfiguration in dynamic way, for which the essential challenge is, we believe , the representation of SD still. Our approach is enlightened by π-calculus that makes process reconfigurable [10] , and assumes that the duty is composed of the interaction commitment of process, i.e. privilege(see section 3.3), and the result of SD is a collection of interaction commitments, i.e. regulation(see section 2). The examples in section 5 show the flexibility and usefulness of our approach.
Regulation
There are two synchronized complementary actions in an interaction [10] . The guarded action is an action with one preceding action that has not been reduced. We have two processors that execute these actions respectively. These actions represent the semantics of this interaction of the two processors.
A component is featured with the composition of distinct functions and consists of corresponding processors. One function features one processor in design, and one processor runs one action in one process (runtime). The sequence of observed action represents a process and reflects the implementation of function intention. So the sequence of programmed action represents an interaction commitment. Moreover, the intersection of interaction commitment involved in an interaction are not empty.
Although component is neutral, system works in a conservative way. The framework of system is a guarding processor and guards each interaction of two managed components. The guarding interaction of framework precedes the guarded interaction of component.
Regulation of system is a collection of interaction commitments, including the interaction commitments of framework and of component. For the systems based on privilege calculus, the result of separation of duty is regulation, i.e. a collection of privilege.
Structure of Privilege
In this section, we give the structure of privilege with the help of notions, employment and condition. The notion of employment is the refined structure of function intention.
Employment
Definition 1. The function-entity employment f /e means that function f is employed on entity e. Proposition 1. There are employments, f 1 /e 1 and f 2 /e 2 ,
Then we introduce the left employment mergence of function-entity.
Proposition 2.
There are employments, f 1 /e 1 = ∅ and f 2 /e 2 = ∅.
f /e, if f = f 1 = f 2 = ∅ and e = e 1 = e 2 = ∅; ∅, otherwise.
Definition 2. F is a collection of functions, and E is a collection of entities.
The employment F/E is a set {f /e|f ∈ F, e ∈ E}.
Let F , F 1 , and F 2 be respectively a collection of functions, and let E, E 1 , and E 2 be a collection of entities. We have f 1 ∈ F 1 , f 2 ∈ F 2 , e 1 ∈ E 1 , and e 2 ∈ E 2 . The mergence of employment is
The composition of employment is
For the convenience of computation, we give F/∅ = ∅, ∅/E = ∅ and ∅/∅ = ∅. If no confusion arises, these expressions,f /e, {f } /e and f / {e}, are the same as {f } / {e}. With definition 2 and equations 1 and 2, we prove that the employment are associative, commutative and distributive.
Condition
Regulation is different from process, which we have discussed in section 2. The condition acts as the connection with the state of "process world". In this subsection, we propose the definition of condition.
Definition 3. The fact set T is a collection of subsets of statement collection
S. The fact set T on S has the following properties:
1. ∅ and S are in T .
The union of the elements of any sub-collection of T is in T . 3. The intersection of the elements of any finite sub-collection of T in T .
Definition 4. Fact set T on S, condition r is a function r : T s → {1, 0} with the property: ∀x 1 , x 2 ∈ T and
The {1, 0} is the true value. If the fact x ∈ T , we call that the condition r is supported on the fact x, or the fact x supports the condition r.
Definition 5. For fact set T on S and condition r, if r(x) is true, the fact x ∈ T is the evidence to r. Definition 6. For fact set T on S, ∃x * ∈ T and such that x * is the evidence to the condition r, if ∄x ⊂ x * and such that x is the evidence to r, then the x * is the minimum evidence to r.
Privilege
Definition 7. For a collection of functions F , a collection of entities E and a collection of conditions R, the privilege is (F/E, R).
For convenience, we define, (∅, r) = ∅.
Definition 8. The privilege space P is a collection of subsets of P with the following properties:
, and
For all privilege, u, v, w ∈ P, u * (v + w) = u * v + u * w.
Normal Form of Privilege
Definition 9. The employment arrangement M is a finite collection of employment and such that ∀m, n ∈ M, m = n ∧ m * n = ∅.
Definition 10. To employment arrangement M , the normal form of privilege p is
where f i /E i is an element of M and c i is a condition.
Proposition 4. To employment arrangement M , every privilege is structurally equal to its normal form.

Definition 11. To employment arrangement M , the privileges are structural equivalence, if and only if they have the same normal form,
When one condition has an evidence, these privileges that involve the condition are pulsed. Corresponding to normal form of privilege, there is the pulsed form.
Definition 12.
To employment arrangement M , on the fact t ∈ T , the pulsed form of privilege p is
We have a sequence of fact Q = (t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t j , . . . ). We get the sequence of pulse to privilege t,
This sequence of pulsed form describes the trace of process about privilege p. The trace matrix (c i,j ) of privilege p is made from this sequence, where c i,j ∈ {1, 0} .
For example, we have two operations (privileges) op 1 and op 2 , and three people (privileges) u 1 , u 2 and u 3 . We want to know what will happen at time (facts) t 0 and t 1 . So we define a gauging privilege, g = (u 1 +u 2 +u 3 ) * (op 1 +op 2 ). And the sequence of pulse is (pfm M (g, t 0 ), pfm M (g, t 1 )). The congruence ∼ and the compliance * ∼ are a function P × P × T → {1, 0}. So they can be a condition in one high-order privilege. For a compliance example, we have the privileges, g, p and q, and such that g = [p * ∼ q]. We call that the privilege g is a high-order privilege of p and q.
Discussion
In general, the role-based models, such as RBAC reference model [11, 5] , AR-BAC [12] , and T-RBAC [13] , have constructs, such as, USERS, ROLES, OPS (operations), and OBJS (objects), and relations, such as UA(user-to-role assignment), PA(permission-to-role assignment), PRMS (set of permission), and RH (role inheritance relation). These constructs are able to be defined with privilege and these relation with privileges. And these privileges are glued by privilege's operations, such as privilege mergence and privilege composition.
The following code is a demonstration written in PAL(Privilege Analysis Language) that is a reference implementation based on privilege calculus. With this demonstration we discuss cases about privilege representation. Shown by the above code, we have four operations, read, list, write, and remove, two roles, reader and manager, two users, bob and may, and two terminals, of f icepc and phone. The statement "let" declares that doc1 is a document in the category T echDoc. The role reader can read any documents in T echDoc and list entries of those, and the role manager can write and remove any one in T echDoc and manager inherits all of reader's privileges that are limited in T echDoc. User bob plays the role reader and User may has the role manager. The mobile phone, a terminal device, has a limitation to access, read and list.
So far, we have defined these privileges: read, list, write, remove, reader, manager, bob, may, of f icepc, phone, doc1, and T echDoc.
While user bob has logged in system at his of f icepc, and the system creates his session, session 1 = bob * of f icepc. In session 1 , bob is able to read, list and write any one in T echDoc.
Later bob uses his personal phone to navigate the system, the session 2 is created automatically, session 2 = bob * phone . The session 2 's privileges are different from session 1 's. We set an employment arrangement, M = read + list + write + remove. Thus, With the above computation, we know the session 2 lacks the employment 'write' on T echDoc. It is interesting that the session in system can be created as a privilege and these constructs, such as session, user, role, permission, group, location etc., could be represented by privilege.
We continue the story. User bob wants to read the document doc1 that is a T echDoc. The guard readguard to the action read is
The readguard is the high-order privilege of session 1 and read/doc1. The pulse of readguard depends on the session 1 's compliance to read/doc1.
User may has logged in, and her session is session 3 . She wants to write the document doc1. The regulation does concern not only may's privilege but also the doc1's. So the privilege doc1 is redefined, doc1 = readable+writable. Because the doc1's "writable" action and the may's "write" action are complementary in this synchronized interaction, writeguard and writableguard are defined, writegurad = write * [session 3 * ∼(write/doc1)] , writableguard = writable * [doc1 * ∼(writable)] .
Thus, we have the interaction guard interactionguard, interactionguard = writeguard + writableguard .
Finally, the session 3 's compliance and the doc1's compliance consistently make the pulse of interactionguard.
Conclusion
Separation of duty is critical not only in security control but also in modeling and monitoring of business logic. For improving reconfigurability of representation of duty, we propose privilege calculus. With the help of privilege's normal form and pulsed form, we are able to analyze the structure of privilege and to monitor the change in process. We also have demonstrated that the access control model based on privilege calculus is compatible with RBAC, ACL.
